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ABSTRACT

The persistent fertility decline that has been spreading from Western European countries
to the rest of the world has been a heated subject of research. It not only has serious impacts for
local demographics and labor markets, but also affects global trends of population mobility. The
Second Demographic Transition (SDT), a theoretical framework based on the study of social
dynamics in Western Europe and other developed societies, has been widely adopted and
examined by scholars around the world since its introduction in the 1970s. The mechanism of
SDT is based on shifts in values, rather than a result of structural evolutions like the First or
Classic Demographic Transition (FDT), which gives the theory a more culture-specific nature. Is
the SDT as globally applicable as the FDT? Scholars offer different perspectives.
Many theoretical and empirical research on fertility trends in Asian countries emerged in
recent years. In the case of China, for example, only part of the characteristics of current fertility
trends are consistent with the Second Demographic Transition, and the unconformable rest are
results of China's specific cultural influences (Yu and Xie 2019). This paper studies interviews of
18 urban middle-class women about their reproductive decision-making process, including their
meaning-making of children and their strategic plan on having children. The result shows that
urban middle-class women’s values on fertility and the structural factors that shape their fertility
decision both present remarkable generational differences. However, these shifts did not
necessarily affect their ideal number of children. Under multiple influences of social norms,
economic development and political agenda, China appears to be experiencing the First and the
Second Demographic Transition partially and simultaneously.
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INTRODUCTION

First demographic transition (FDT) indicates the shifting process of population from
high fertility, high mortality to low fertility, low mortality. It was first observed in the 18th
century in Western Europe, where industrialization and modernization achieved world-leading
progress. Due to the advancement in technology and medical services as well as improvement in
living standard and hygiene conditions, mortality declined and life expectancy lengthened. High
fertility behavior intended as an adaptation to high infant mortality was thus rendered less
necessary. In addition, the professionalization of the job market and the establishment of the
modern education system has changed people’s living arrangement and raised the cost of
child-rearing. As a result, parents chose to have less children in order to optimize the economic
outcome of the whole family. FDT projects that fertility will decline to a replacement level and
persists; population growth will arrive at zero due to the ultimate balance of fertility and
mortality. This trend is considered a necessary evolution of all human societies (Coale 1989). It
has spread from Western Europe to other parts of the world, and was estimated to be completed
globally by 2100 (Lee 2003). By the second half of the 20th century, most developing countries
have started this transition and most developed countries have completed it. Although after
World War II, the Baby Boom occured in the 1960s as an short-term phenomenon of economic
recovery and social stability, it was soon followed by a Baby Bust in the 1970s towards the
replacement level, signifying the ending phase of the FDT in most of the developed countries.
However, since the 1970s, the developed countries have witnessed a further decline in
fertility to sub-replacement level. Scholars coined it as the Second Demographic Transition
(SDT), a result of a systematic postponement of marriage, a rising divorce rate, and increasing
choices of cohabitation and extra-marital births (Van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1995; Lesthaeghe
2014). Different from the First Demographic Transition, the SDT is a more culturally motivated
shift in values. One prominent reason is that women are increasingly empowered by rising
participation in the labor force after WWII and more access to higher education. Marriage was
then widely postponed due to longer time spent in education systems and an increasing desire for
career achievements. Ample research and studies on many developed and developing countries
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across the world have documented a high correlation between low fertility and rising
socioeconomic status of women (Balk 1997; Davis 1986; Dharmalingam and Morgan 1996;
Phan 2013). In addition, a rising share of cohabitation is disintegrating the dominant position of
marriage, and the connection between marriage and childbearing has been deconstructed:
married couples might choose childfree lifestyles for self-fulfilment, and unmarried individuals
might choose to have extra-marital births (Cherlin 2004; Van de Kaa 2004). These changes were
enabled by higher access to more effective contraceptives. Instead of a preventive measure,
couples nowadays use contraceptives as an active tool for family planning (Van de Kaa 1987).
Based on a value shift of people, however, the Second Demographic Transition model
was hugely subject to culture-specific influences, which indicate that it might not apply to other
societies as neatly as to Western Europe. In fact, scholars have observed different patterns of
population decline. In Romania, for example, Rotariu (2006) found that despite the emergence of
a significant fertility change, the contemporary attitudes on family mode, size and values
remained little altered from the traditional value systems. He concluded that the transition was
more of a result from a wide range of macrostructural and institutional transformations.
In the case of China, the process of demographic transition was more complicated and
should be studied under specific measurement such as strong influences of politics and
traditional culture. Under a series of forceful state policies on fertility, the population plunged
immediately to around the replacement level in less than ten years. During 1970 and 1979 alone,
the total fertility rate (TFR) in China decreased from 5.8 to 2.7 (Jing 2013). Under the goal of
reaching a population growth rate of 1 percent in 1980 and zero growth in 2000 (Kane and Choi
1999), Chinese government issued the One-Child Policy to accelerate the population decline.
Apart from numerous implementation deficits that violate human rights, this policy-driven abrupt
drop in fertility led to an even more intense demographic crisis of the aging population and
shortage of labor force, as well as a severely imbalanced age cohorts facilitated by the lingering
son preference culture (Jing 2013; Kane and Choi 1999). As a result, China's TFR declined from
2.94 in 1978 to 2.14 in 1991, and further to 1.6 in 1999, then rebounded to around 1.7 in 2019
(The World Bank 2019) due to the enforcement of Two-Child Policy in 2015--still under
replacement level.
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Although the draconian political interference did contribute remarkably to the rapid
demographic decline in China, scholars argued that it is not the only cause for the persistent low
fertility. Substantial socioeconomic development and urbanization processes started in the 1980s
were also instrumental to the population transition (Cai 2010; Guo et al. 2012).

Studies on the demographic transition in China often focus on macro-level factors, such
as the increasingly aging population, shrinkage of the labor force, the imbalanced sex ratio at
birth, etc. Meanwhile, the micro-level household and individuals, their fertility patterns and
incentives receive comparatively less attention. Even scarcer studies have focused on women,
instead of households, and discuss the decision-making process of their fertility choices.
Therefore, this study seeks to explore all the factors influencing women’s fertility plans,
behaviors and family planning ideals within a gendered context, from women’s perspective.
Through qualitative approaches, this study attempts to draw a few fertility patterns of urban
married women in contemporary society, and to depict their negotiations with China’s patriarchal
society.
Fertility decision is not only one of the most important planning in an individual's life and
family, but also the component of the macro-level demographic changes. To make a decision of
fertility, one generally goes through two steps: whether to have children and how many children
to have. The former suggests the meaning-making of children while the latter concerns a more
quantitative aspect: how much should be invested on children and how many children should be
sharing that limited time and resources, etc. Fertility decisions indicate what children mean to
contemporary parents, what role they are playing in the urban households and what expectations
they bear from both parents and the society, which reveals the cultural and structural background
such as the pattern of gender ideologies, family and life ideals, economic level and political
agenda, etc. For example, parents who demand children primarily for old-age economic support
could be indicating an underdeveloped pension system, a relatively low cost in child rearing, or a
strict ideology of filial piety that emphasizes what children owe to their parents. Women who
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consider motherhood essential to womanhood might be indicating a persistent social norm that
defines women with their fertility behavior.
During the decision-making process, women’s degree of autonomy in their fertility
decision is also crucial information that sheds light on women’s empowerment, the existing
patriarchal norms and contemporary family dynamics. In consideration of the interwoven nature
of cultural and structural factors’ impact on women’s fertility decisions, this chapter analyzes
their decision-making process in three sections: why children, number of children and autonomy
in decision. In each section, cultural and structural factors are collectively reviewed through
analysis of quotes from interviewees.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

Second Demographic Transition
Van de Kaa (1987) concluded four main features of the second demographic transition
that emerged in developed countries in West Europe and North America during the 1980s. First,
a shift “from preventive contraception to self-fulfilling contraception”. Prior to the second
demographic transition, contraceptives were used to passively prevent excessive births out of
one’s economic capacity, while nowadays contraceptives are used to actively plan the family size
to satisfy more self-fulfilling desires. Second, cohabitation as a new form of household
organization is rising in share and threatening the domination of marriage. Couples raise children
together without the necessity to go into a wedlock, because the law system has advanced to
secure the rights and life quality of children born out of a marriage. Third, families are shifting
from “children-centered” institutions to more and more “couple-centered”. Childbearing was
once an indispensable procedure in life and the primary function of a family, because children
used to be guarantees of persistent economic resources and the possibility of upward mobility for
families. As the cost of childrearing increases, and the couples are more likely to prioritize their
individual ideals and goals. Fourth, pluralistic families and households increase to take a
significant part.
As a result, most of these countries rely on welfare policies that encourage women to
have more children or policies that attract immigrants to fill in the blank of the local labor
market. However, as the statistics of global fertility show, governments generally have fairly
limited influences on its attempt to stimulate population growth. Most of the developed
countries’ fertility level remains below replacement level and the population growth of some
European countries even declined further below zero.

Alternations of the Theory
However, some scholars have also considered the theory of the second demographic
transition inadequate in explaining the declining fertility trend in certain countries. Second
demographic transition is based on the shift of people’s value systems that strongly affects their
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attitudes towards family models and personal fulfillment, which, in other words, emphasizes the
subjective and individual factors. To examine this theory, Traian Rotariu (2006) researched on
the attitudes towards family mode, size and values during a significant fertility decline in
Romania, and found that the contemporary attitudes remained little changed from the traditional
value systems. He thus argued that the fertility change resulted from a wide range of
macrostructural and institutional transformations. Individual factors of shifts in people’s values
and lifestyles, while do interact with the structural factors, remain mostly a reflection of the
latter.
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BACKGROUND

Household and Intergenerational Transfers
Households observed during the fertility policy era in China had a major shift from a
large, patriarchal one to a smaller, pair-centered one. Chinese traditional household ideal or
personal life goal of a big patrilineal family where multiple generations co-reside can only be
realized through a relatively high fertility rate and a low infant and adult mortality rate. With
strict population control policies enacted, this ideal was systematically sabotaged by the low
fertility rate. Internally, after the average education level of people rises, they intend to lead more
self-fulfilling lives instead of limiting their life goal to only reproduction and spending their
lifetime caring for their huge household. Especially, when women were exposed to higher
education and more job opportunities, they tend to get liberated from the burdensome
child-rearing practices and turn to more self-fulfilling practices to establish their social security
and sense of belongings in the world which is previously missing from the patriarchal system.
This tradition is facilitated by the historical patriarchal dominance and low social status of
women in the family. In Wolf’s (1972) studies on rural Taiwan, women’s fertility behaviors were
decided completely by their husbands and parents-in-law.

“Wan-Xi-Shao” (1972-1979) and One child policy (1980-2015)
The major population decline in China started in the 1970s when demographic policy
“wan-xi-shao” (late, large spaces, few) was enacted and culminated in the One-Child Policy era,
which means political propaganda and strict regulations play crucial roles in this abrupt
demographic transition. However, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Chinese
people had no decision on fertility plans. According to the 1990 Population Census of China, the
overall proportion of first-child births in 1989 was only 49.5% to all births of that year. About
31.7% of the total births were second-child births, and more than 19% of children born in 1989
were third or even higher order births in their families (People's Daily, 1991; Population Census
Office, 1991). Although One-Child Policy had greater impacts in urban areas through severe
punishment and examinations in careers, it is common for parents desiring more than one child
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to go through all the troubles, such as submitting fines and traveling to another country or region,
in order to have more children. In brief, political restrictions acted as a potent external factor on
people’s fertility choices but not necessarily the decisive one.

Implementation in Urban and Rural Area
One-Child Policy had different effectiveness and efficiency when implemented in the
urban and rural areas. Overall, the urban area generated a more successful outcome after the
enforcement of the policy. In Shanghai, for instance, the fertility rate was around replacement
level even before the full implementation of One-Child Policy. Reasons for this effectiveness
include both internal motives and external influences. Internally, residents in the urban area
generally have higher education than those in the rural area, thus less incentives towards having
children. First, people with higher education generally obtain more economic opportunities and
resources, therefore, they do not have the urge to raise children for old age economic support.
Second, urban residents were more vulnerable to the politic punishment because a large part of
them

Empowerment of Urban Daughters and Mothers
Despite numerable problems it created such as work force sustainability and heavily tilted
sex ratio, One-Child Policy did enable the empowering process of women in the urban area
where it was carried out more successfully. The only daughters born during this era subsequently
acquired more access to family resources that were previously reserved for the sons.

Economic Reform and “Open-Up” Policy (1978)
According to previous studies on fertility trends and the model of second demographic
transition, besides the wide spreading knowledge of contraceptive uses, women’s socioeconomic
status and education attainment acted actively in shifting values towards family composition,
child-rearing and self-fulfilment, which directly facilitated the fertility decline. In China, a major
shift in macro-level environment, a milestone of economic development started at the same time
as the demographic policy -- the market economy reform in 1978. The resulting soar of average
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people’s socioeconomic status in China exerted significant influences over people’s fertility
choices.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
This research focused on urban ever-married women with children. Considering the
promulgation of Two-Child Policy in 2015, I intend to interview women who are able to have
two children legally during their fertility period. According to the National Health Service (UK),
the menopause usually occurs between 45 and 55 years of age. Therefore, the oldest age cohort
to be in their reproductive years when Two-Child Policy started is people born in the 1960s.
Concerning that the legal marriage age in China is 20 for women, I will interview 18 women
born in the 1960s to the 1990s in Shenzhen online and analyze the answers they gave.
The theory of SDT attributes the population decline mainly to the shift of values towards
marriage, ideal family pattern and self-fulfillment throughout decades. To examine these
historical alterations in a closer lens, I selected people living in Shenzhen----a top-ranking urban
city in mainland China----and identified as middle-class to participate in my online interviews.
Within this identification, interviewees’ socioeconomic status and educational attainment are
relatively similar. Therefore, their diverse values on family and children mainly reflect the
intergenerational differences that are facilitated by economic development, political influences,
and the shifting gender norms over time.
To examine these differences, I divided my interviewees into age groups for comparison.
In America and some other English-speaking countries, generations are often defined and
divided with regard to significant historical events such as abrupt demographic change--Baby
Boomer, or the revolutionary lifestyle facilitated by technology--Gen Z. In China, however,
generational identification nowadays often comes with the unit of decade, such as “after 80”,
“after 90”. These identifications have been widely used in media and daily life since the 1980s.
A key reason for this rising consciousness of generations is that a series of historical events
happened to take place in China at the turn of 1980s. One-Child Policy, officially begun in 1979,
has turned “after 80” the first generation of single children. Economic Reform and Opening-Up
Policy, enacted in the end of 1978, replaced planned economy with market economy and started
China’s active participation in globalization. Society was highly concerned about the epochal
transformation of the whole nation, and the media started to use the term “after 80” to portrait
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this first generation born into the new era. Older generations always tend to view young people
through skeptical and critical lenses. Apart from the applause for their international sight, “after
80” are more often than not accused of being “self-centered”, “irresponsible”, “difficult”, and
“fragile” etc., under the rising individualism. In the elders’ eyes, they were spoiled to grow up in
a society with such abundance, and concerned more about individual well-being than politics.
They became the “Beat Generation” in China. When “after 90” came up on the stage, they
inevitably became the new target of bias.
Therefore, in order to discuss age cohorts more indegenous to the culture, interviewees
were divided into “60s” “70s” “80s” and “90s”.
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CHAPTER ONE
Why Children: Meaning-Making of Fertility

I think, as a woman, if she doesn’t have a child, her life is incomplete. You must be a
mother. From a daughter, and then getting married, after that you should become a
mother, otherwise your life is incomplete.
—— Li, born in 1967.
I think it’s people’s own choice. Do you need the role of children in your family? Does
your ideal family include children? Do you desire the existence of children in your life…
I think these are the most important criteria in fertility decisions… People have different
family of origin and social backgrounds, so I respect their own choices. As long as they
are happy, it’s not much of a problem.
—— Hua, born in 1982.

To investigate the root motivation for reproduction sounds peculiar at first sight, since it
has been an animal instinct restored in our genes from the dawn of human history. It was this
inheritance that maintained human species on earth. However, as human society evolved, the
survival value attached to the reproduction process has transferred into diverse cultural norms
and practices in different societies. Like many other societies in the world, Chinese society, or to
be specific, culture of Han ethnic, has long been adopting a patriarchal system that authorizes the
patriarch of the family, values filial piety, pays substantial respect to the patrilineal family line,
and practices patrilocal marriage, etc. (Ebrey 1990). While Phan (2013) reached the conclusion
of “patriarchal cultural factors are often associated with lower levels of women's empowerment
and higher fertility” by her studies, this correlation is already made explicit in famous quotes of
Confucian icons. Mencius, a philosopher as well as a major representative of Confucianism said,
“there are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them.” Filial
piety, one of the central values of Confucianism cannot be practiced without reproduction.
Carrying on the family lines, the ultimate way to pay respects to one’s ancestors, thus becomes a
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life purpose and a virtue for Chinese people. Regarding the high mortality rate in Chinese history
prior to the second half of 20th century, high fertility was the only measure to secure at least
some offspring of a family name.
In addition to the aspect of extending the patrilineal family line as a task or a familial
responsibility, it does benefit individuals in a more philosophical way. Margery Wolf (1972)
infers in her work on women and family structure in Peihotien, Taiwan: residents there are
obsessed with the continuance of their family line, because this long family history connecting
the past and the future provides individuals with a sense of belonging and value of one’s limited
life in the indefinite time, helping them navigate themselves through the wide, dangerous world.
Entering the 19th century, global mortality first reached a steady decline in northwest
Europe due to advanced medical techniques, awareness of personal hygiene and improvements
in nutrition. By the early twentieth century, many other countries with lower income had also
obtained a secular mortality decline and a longer life expectancy, which further accelerated after
World War II. During 1950 and 1955, China’s life expectancy was 41 on average, and that figure
rose to 70 during 1995 and 1999 (Lee 2003). Decreasing mortality has rendered high fertility less
necessary, and the increasing survival rate of infants and longer life expectancy of mothers has
reduced the fraction of women’s adult life spent in child-bearing and child-rearing, from 70
percent in 1800 to about 14 percent nowadays (Lee 2003). Time spent in motherhood has been
physically shrinking. After WWII, women began to participate in the industrial labor force
significantly on a global scale and thus rising to a larger share of economic and political power.
As social roles and expectations for women changed, the role of motherhood has also been losing
its central position in womanhood. During the Second Demographic Transition starting in the
western Europe in the 1970s, childbearing became more and more of a personal choice than a
designed path or task bound with marriage.
In China, prior to the founding of PRC, some urban Chinese women have already
ventured into the public area and experienced unprecedented freedom out of the patriarchal
domestic constraints (Judge 2005). In Maoist era, the advocacy of gender equality laid its
emphasis on the equal entry of women into production and labor. As Deng Yingchao (1953),
chair of the All China Women’s Federation, wrote, “Ten years of practice has proven that

15

mobilizing the masses of women to participate in production is the basic key to improving
equality between men and women and to achieving the thorough liberation of women.” Women
became laborers, soldiers and group leaders. Visual femininity was criticized as “bourgeois” and
women experienced a masculinization that alienated their own sexuality (Honig 2002). However,
reproductive behaviors were also included in a political agenda, as high fertility was seen as
adding strength to the new republic.
In the post-Mao era, economic reform replaced planned economy with market economy,
while open-up policy involved China into globalization. The socialist order disintegrated and a
wave of individualism swept over China. These structural and cultural changes have further
broadened women’s career opportunities and upward mobility, as well as increasing their
incentives for self-fulfilment. However, their desires to achieve economic independence still
clash with the persisting social expectation for them to enter marriage and perform traditional
female roles. On one hand, as Yu and Xie’s (2019) statistics show, first marriage is postponed,
the rate of cohabitation and divorce gradually rises; on the other hand, most people still plan to
enter marriage at some point, while deliberate childfree marriages and children born outside of
marriage remain rare, which indicates that marriage and childbearing are still tightly associated.
Nonetheless, the economic incentives for childbearing declined, since GDP rose, economic
conditions improved and the welfare system established.
In brief, fertility choices experienced stages of survival intentions, norm or expectation,
and personal preferences throughout history. My interviews also suggest generational differences
in some aspects of meaning-making of children. Generally, more “60s” and “70s” considered
social norms their major motivation of fertility behavior, while the “80s” and “90s” tended to
stress their personal affection towards children. The definition of womanhood also shifted from
older to younger age cohorts, with the former centered more on motherhood, and the latter more
decentralized and diversified. Although many interviewees across the age cohorts mentioned the
phrase “extension of life” as their reason for having children, their implication varied through
generations. The notion of carrying on the family line, on the contrary, does not suggest evident
generational differences, but appears to be more affected by regional cultures. Finally, familism
and the need for emotional support from children still prevail in contemporary society.
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Norms and Tasks
Not until several conducted interviews had I realized that, my questions in the section
“why children” are designed with an assumption that all my interviewees possess clear ultimate
purposes in having children and are aware of their deep, original motivations such as old age
care, desire for lifelong company or even just personal preference “I like kids”, which is why it is
a little surprising that many, especially the “60s”, answered my question with a hesitating denial:
“there’s no why.” More often than not, this answer is followed by a set of comments centering on
the words “should” and “everyone”. “You should have kids after marriage,” “having kids is
something women should do,” “everyone has kids, so should you.” Even scholars have shown
the strong social norms among Chinese people that combine marriage and child rearing, it was
still unexpected that people admitted to be primarily motivated by these, instead of other feelings
or practical concerns. These replies made me re-examine the pivotal position of social norms in
the decision making on child-bearing. They seem to be entirely accepted without doubts, among
four out of five interviewees in the “60s” group, three out of five in the “70s”, one out of five
“80s” and one out of three “90s”.

Actually, for our generation childbearing is simple, we didn’t consider that much.
Because you are married, and when you are pregnant you just naturally choose to have
the child. It feels like a natural law, of fertility.
—— Yong, born in 1964
Well… I just think that, when you are married you should have kids. It’s just natural and
everyone does that. It might seem strange to others if you don’t have kids after marriage,
personally speaking.
—— Hong, born in 1971
At that time we weren’t thinking that much. Everyone else has kids, so we also have a
kid. I think at that time we were simple, we weren't thinking that much.
—— Liu, born in 1970
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It’s like, a traditional thinking, like, after marriage you should have kids, also like, for
carrying on the family line.
—— Cathy, born in 1985
Umm, I didn’t think about it specifically, I think maybe it’s a Chinese traditional thinking
that you should have children after marriage, you should pass it on. Your life obtains
certain meaning after you have children. Something like that.
—— Lu, born in 1992

The pattern of married life with kids is so ingrained in people’s (mostly people in “after
60” and “after 70” groups) mind that most of them claimed they were too “simple” to consider
other purposes for having children. Childbearing is less of an active family plan or a life strategy
deliberately designed for a better experience of womanhood, but a “natural”, “regular” and
“normal” path to follow, in order to evade potential risks of other uncustomary life styles. Under
this path dependence and herd behavior, child-bearing is considered more of a “task” or
“mission” in women’s married life, as some of them express their feelings after childbirth,
especially those who endured more unpleasant experiences in preparation for childbirth:

I was just thinking that I have reached this age. Get married as you are supposed to at this
age, have children as you are supposed to at this age, so you just do whatever is proper
for your age. Not so much of a sheer desire for children, thinking “I must have children”,
no. You want a child, and you have one, it’s like finishing a task. If you don’t have one, a
regret.
—— Hong, born in 1971
At that time, when I finally gave birth successfully, that kind of mixed feelings...It’s like,
mission accomplished! All the sacrifices are worthy.
—— Ming, born in 1966
Q: Have you considered having two children before your pregnancy?
A: No! No… I just think that, one child counts as a “mission complete”, done. Not
another… I think I cannot shoulder the responsibility.
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—— Wang, born in 1974

Admittedly, though this system of customs or norms on child-bearing serves as a major
motive for women’s decision to have children, this is not the whole picture. Most women I
interviewed who stressed the effect of traditions on their fertility decision also mentioned other
reasons for plans of childbearing. For example, they might also think children are cute, or
consider children the only reliable source of lifelong emotional support. Decision to have
children for them is not rational or motivated enough, yet not reluctant or struggling either.
Perhaps it is among those women who expressed their doubt about children or even disfavor
against children before childbirth that we can perceive the pervasiveness of cultural norms in
women’s fertility decisions. Three interviewees out of twenty mentioned their uncertainty
towards child-rearing before marriage. Hong, born in 1971, has a daughter who just returned
from college overseas. She came to Shenzhen in 1995 from Shandong, a province in northern
China and got married the same year. She was then pregnant in 1996 but unfortunately had a
miscarrige. Three months after the miscarriage she was again pregnant and immediately returned
to her hometown to keep the baby. She repeatedly mentioned her fear of losing this child and the
inability of having children ever again, although she appeared to be very ambivalent towards the
concept of children:

You see before J (her daughter), the stilborn, it has been less than 3 months since the
miscarriage when I was pregnant with J. At that time we were afraid that the uterus might
not be fully recovered, so I took a lot of things to keep the baby, fearing the loss of this
one, and all sorts of examinations, everyday. I already quit my work that time, and stayed
in the house everyday, fearing the possibility of miscarriage. Because you have already
lost one, you are just too scared… When you don’t want children you don’t feel it, but
when you want to have children but can't succeed, you have different feelings. So after I
lost the first one----unable to get pregnant for over two years after the marriage, and then
a miscarriage, and then this one----you put great focus on this one, just too scared of
losing it or unable to be pregnant again. That was really stressful. At that time I just
forgot about myself, fat or slim, doesn’t matter. I just didn’t care that much about myself.
…
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When I was young I didn’t think of it. I really hate kids. And now, to be honest, I don’t
really like other kids either. I was just thinking that I have reached this age. Get married
as you are supposed to at this age, have children as you are supposed to at this age, so you
just do whatever is proper for your age.

Throughout the whole interview, she did not mention old-age economical sources,
life-long emotional support, fun in life, affection for children, or other purposes often associated
with childbearing decisions, but only it’s the “proper thing to do” at a certain age. This rule has
overcome her distaste against children, turning her to painstaking efforts including quitting her
job and accepting all the possible (most of them painful) treatment in order to have a child of her
own.
From another perspective, the norm of marriage with children suggests a principle that,
women’s decision to enter marriage should be her tacit approval of having a child. In other
words, women who decide not to have children should not enter a marriage. Ming, born in 1966,
questioned: “If you don’t want children, why bother entering a marriage? ” Wang, born in 1974,
just gave birth to a son in 2019 at the age of 45, after seven years of marriage. She is now one of
the core members of an NGO. When asked about why children, she first said it was a
crowd-following decision, then admitted that it was all for her husband. She is also the only
interviewee that made a clear statement on her disfavor against having children, and stressed her
career as a life center and a security source.

Q: So why do you choose to have a kid?
A: Umm... Doesn’t everybody have kids? So I shall have one too, just like that.
Q: I see… So do you like kids too? Or is it like, I should have one so I did.
A: More like “I should have one”. After the childbirth I really like the kid. But before it,
not so much.
Q: Not so much before… so you grew fond of kids during your pregnancy? Or…
A: I only began to like kids after childbirth I guess… During the pregnancy it’s more like
everyone has one… it seems strange if you don’t… And many people said that, after 50,
if you don’t have kids, you will blah blah blah… So I decided to have one before 50.
Q: Have you considered the need for children’s company, or other kinds of thought?
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A: Umm, according to myself honestly, no, I haven’t thought that much… It’s simply just
what my husband’s family seems to want… like, simply, my husband wants a child, then
I was like, fulfilling his wish. I haven’t thought about my dependence on the child, no.
Q: So between you and your husband, he wants children more.
A: Yes, yes. He wants more. I’m like, not that into it.
…

A: I think childbearing is just… too much responsibility. The reason why I don’t want
children all along is that, I think I’m not enough, (that I) cannot become a very
responsible mother. I also have my life centered on work too much, my career gives me
more security than I can obtain from my family. So I prefer my career.

To Wang, her fertility plan was entirely a result of her husband’s (and part of his family’s)
wish. Interestingly though, her husband didn’t insist on children at first. She mentioned that her
husband said “childfree is ok” before marriage, so they were “letting nature take its course” for
the first few years. According to her, after he took a job in investment in education, he started to
change his mind: most of his colleagues have children, so he was often asked about his family,
and “felt pressured”. He began to bring up the topic more and more often, and finally she agreed
to give it a try. However, her preparation for children went rough, even threatening their
relationship. On the verge of divorce, her husband’s “understanding” touched her, made her more
determined and finally succeeded.
At that time I was seeing the doctors, but after one year still nothing happened. I was
taking Chinese medicine everyday! Chinese medicine, west medicine, this and that…
Then I said, how about we just divorce… I think I cannot take it anymore. Before
marriage he didn’t say he wanted a kid so desperately… now I can’t stand it. I said, you
can find someone suitable, younger and more fertile, and we get a divorce secretly… He
once told me that it doesn’t matter whether we have children or not. If worse comes to
worst, we can still adopt. This is what he said before marriage! Then, when he asked for
children so badly, I was really in torment… so I suggested he finds someone else. Then
he said, “I didn’t say you must have a kid, but you should at least go through the
process.” So you have to make that effort, if there’s still no success, then he can accept
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it… When he said this I was actually pretty moved. I think he makes sense. We don’t
have to have our own children, but now that we are a family, it’s not an unreasonable
request for me to want children. If you don’t even try, and just go straight for adoption, he
might feel regretful. I think I can accept this. So I made up my mind and made efforts,
and now this.

In Wang’s case, rather than accusing her husband for pushing her to settle with an
unwanted fertility plan, one should reexamine their perception of the institution, marriage, which
seems to have been the major cause that persuaded her into having children. Although she was
clearly not desiring children at first and tried to reach an agreement with her husband, her
entrance into a marriage is considered as a compromise to a possible change of mind in the
future, because desiring children is “a reasonable request” in marriage. Moreover, this
compromise not only includes changing her life plan, but also a possible painstaking effort to
reach the goal. “You should at least try.” The possible suffering and hardship of childbearing is
also a “reasonable” sacrifice for women in marriage.
For me, first of all, being a part of a family you cannot be too selfish. This is also what
some of my closest friends as well as great mentors have told me. They said, you cannot
be too selfish as a person. When you want to hold a family together, you have to take
everyone’s feelings into consideration. When their requests are reasonable, you need to
accept them and compromise, that’s the first thing.

The social norm that deems childbearing as the default setting of marriage and a
legitimate task of all married women outweighs the practical purposes of childbearing in these
women’s fertility decisions. Corresponding to scholars’ findings (Yu and Xie 2019), the impact
of this social norm shows generational differences. There is a roughly declining influence from
the older groups to the younger groups. Most people from the “60s” and “70s” group consider
childbearing a required task of married life instead of a life strategy or a family plan, since back
then forming a nuclear family was the crucial criteria for success and fulfilled life. No alternative
lifestyles are considered proper or happy. Those who do not possess any negative expectation
toward children naturally follow this path, while people who originally hold ambivalence or even
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disfavor against children are still assimilated and conformed to similar life choices. However, as
the society developed, meaning-making of life diversified, and alternative family compositions
emerged. Childbearing became a choice that requires careful considerations, and people in the
later generations started to emphasize their personal fondness for children or strategic purposes
of having children. As a result, my interviewees in the “80s” and “90s” group tend to have more
varied reasons, thorough considerations and active participation in their fertility choices, while
the choices of their older counterparts were more shaped by traditional values and the
heterogeneous social expectations.

Affection for Children
It might sound most reasonable to answer the question “why children” with a simple “I
like children”. After all, when fertility is less of an economically rational choice, what else could
motivate a woman to become a mother? It turns out that, as discussed above, the all-mighty
social norms are capable of outweighing personal preferences. Although all interviewees
undoubtedly love their children, consideration of personal affection for children as motivating
their fertility decision varied generationally. For interviewees from “60s” and “70s”, only one of
them explicitly expresses her love of children. Yuan (70s), who took the risk of going to Hong
Kong in order to have a second child, said she “liked children from a young age.” “I remembered
begging my mom for a younger sibling…” she laughed, “I don’t know, maybe I’m just that kind
of ‘mom person’.”
Four out of five “80s” and all three “90s” all expressed their favor for children prior to
the childbearing. Chen, born in 1981, came to Shenzhen in 2001 and married in 2005. She had
her first child in 2006 and the second in 2017, both daughters. She claimed that her affection for
children is the primary reason for her childbearing.
Personally, I think that I was born to like children. I think it mainly depends on individual
personality and preferences… This (preference) takes up a major part of the reason for
me having children.
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Liang was born in 1989, Hebei. She is an only child of a single mother. She came to
Shenzhen in 2012 and married in 2019. She just had a daughter this January. A teacher in a
preschool education agency, she seems to have a lot to talk about children.
I love kids and I really enjoy interacting with them. That’s why I took my job in
education! They are cute, pure and inspiring… Before meeting my husband, I had been
single for quite some time. I was even thinking about having kids on my own, like
finding a sperm donor. You see, my mom divorced when I was very little and she raised
me up alone and well, so I don’t think that’s a problem.

Hua (80s) also mentioned the thought of having children on her own, if “things don’t go
well” between her and her husband. Their thoughts represented a trend of extramarital
childbearing that has been gaining popularity in Western developed countries while gaining
awareness in China. While the “60s” and “70s” were motivated primarily by norms of
marriage-children combination, younger generations have already been exploring other life
paths. Lu, an only child born in 1992, was married in 2015 and had her first child the same year,
at the age of 24. At first, she admitted that she was not planning to have children at such a young
age, but her love for children gradually increased after marriage. She mentioned social media as
a part of the cause.
I have just worked for two years. My original plan was to have children after I had some
savings. But after I got married I found myself obsessed with mommy vloggers on Weibo
(China's Twitter-equivalent). The kids are so cute, and time spent with them are so full of
surprises and fun… and the experiences they share make motherhood seem less
terrifying… So I just thought, why not have children when I’m still young and energetic
enough!

Due to the development of social media, personal interests and motivations are
strengthened by tons of personalized information delivered to users. The younger
generations that grew up in this environment are undoubtedly more influenced by this
technology. Generally, “80s” and “90s” were more willing to express their affection for
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children prior to childbearing, and consider it a major reason for their fertility behavior.
Compared to their previous generations of “60s” and “70s”, they seem to have less
concerns of traditional norms, and thus obtain more autonomy and certainty in their
fertility decisions.

Extension of Life: Family-Benefiting or Self-Fulfilling
When asked about the core reason for having children, seven out of eighteen participants
without clear age-oriented differences mentioned a phrase “extension of life”. It seems to suggest
a certain degree of similarity in fertility choices among all age cohorts. However, their follow up
explanations indicate that they attached rather different definitions to this phrase, which also
shows a generational variety of values towards womanhood and child-rearing. Two interviewee
from the “60s” connected this phrase with the mission of carrying on family’s name, one “70s”
and one “80s” explained it as a sense of accountability to parents, while one “70s”, one “80s”
and one “90s” interpreted it as a prolonged existence of individuals, or some traces left in the
world.
Ming was born in 1966, Shandong. She has four siblings: two elder brothers and two
younger sisters. Married in 1993 at her hometown, she then followed her husband to Shenzhen in
1995, and took a job in a Hong Kong enterprise. She had a son in 1996, and was considering the
possibility of having another child in Hong Kong or abroad. Unfortunately, things went rough
and the attempt failed. When asked to explain the phrase “extension of life” she brought up as a
reason to have children, she mentioned an inherited value on continuing the family surname.
Our generation is still relatively more traditional. Especially in my hometown, people still
put much value on these things. Although my consideration for carrying on the family
line has not been as deep as generations before me, there's still some implicit influence…
It is a more traditional concept… but it does not affect my preference for boys and girls.
Because now girls can also be recorded in the genealogy, so there’s not much difference.

25

Similarly, Pang, who was born in 1964, also explained this term with a stress on the
continuation of her bloodline. This sense of a contribution made to “my own blood’s” prosperity
takes a significant part in the meaning-making of their fertility choices.
Interpretation of this term has a slightly different emphasis for Yuan. She was born in
1975, Qingyuan, Guangdong. She has one elder sister and one younger brother. She came to
Shenzhen in 1998 fresh out of college and got married in 2000. Soon she was pregnant and gave
birth to a daughter in 2001. For her, apart from her own wishes, having children is no longer a
choice benefiting her clan, but a sense of accountability towards her parents.

(Extension of life) It’s like… from my ancestors to my parents' generation to me and then
to my next generation, I guess. This extension, continuation… It's not that you have to
have someone to bear the surname or anything, it's just that having a child makes you feel
accountable to yourself and your parents.

When it comes to Hua, things have changed further. She was born in Foshan, Guangdong
in 1982. Born during the One-Child Policy period, she is an only child just like most of her
peers. She went to a renowned university in Guangzhou, Guangdong and accepted a job offer in
Shenzhen in 2005 after graduation. She also got married immediately in 2006 but was not
pregnant until last year. She claimed that she was “letting nature take its course” for the first two
or three years, with a relatively weak desire for children. However, she gradually changed her
mind as she turned 30.
Because… humans are also mammals. So if we have our own offspring, have our genes
existing in this world, I just think it’s… well maybe this is kind of idealistic, but it’s like,
even if I perished one day, there’s still something of my own existing… Actually I think,
when I was younger—I got married really early. I married at the age of 24. Right after
marriage I didn’t have that strong feeling, or desire to have kids. But when I turned 30, I
thought to myself that my quality time in life was reducing, less than before. It’s like, as
time passes you think increasingly often about what you can leave for this world, except
for your own contribution… When I aged this thought occurred to me.
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Hua later admitted that she, as the first generation of the OCP, tends to be more
“self-centered” and does not think about her responsibilities to her big family very often. Zhu,
born in 1994, Guangdong, shared a similar aspect of self-satisfaction in childbearing. Her family
moved to Shenzhen when she was in kindergarten and stayed here ever since. Married in 2018,
she had a son in 2019, and is considering having another child 2 to 3 years later. In her
perspective, this extension of life, or in her word “human project” that she took charge gave her a
sense of achievement.
I felt a sense of accomplishment when I gave birth to him... No I don’t think it’s
something I owe to my family, it’s just a feeling that belongs to myself… Children are
like the most important project of life that requires full engagement, so successful
cultivation of a human project surely gives me more life satisfaction.

To sum up, Ming and Pang expressed her responsibility to the family clan, Yuan was
more concerned about accountability or filial piety towards her parents, while Hua and Zhu was
seeking the sense of a prolonged existence or accomplishment of a child project that fulfilled
themselves. The target group on which each person projects her fertility meaning is narrowing in
size: clan, direct relatives, oneself. To take it further, Ming and Pang’s connection between
herself and the world was achieved through their blood-related clans, Yuan’s through her nuclear
family, while Hua and Zhu appear to be only in charge of their own direct, individual interactions
with the world.

Carrying on the Family Line
The worship of patrilineal family line is one of the core inheritances from Confucian and
has influenced Chinese culture for thousands of years. However, in contemporary society, urban
citizens have gradually abandoned this traditional mindset and embrace a more modern view
towards fertility. Most of my interviewees from all age cohorts indicated that carrying on the
family line is no longer a concern for this era. “Having children is my own business,” Li (60s)
answered. “I don’t think this mindset still prevails in our generation, especially in cities,” Chen,
who was born in 1981, said. Hua (80s) shared her thoughts on this traditional practice.
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First I think it’s definitely not for carrying on the family line, not like the stereotyped…
because historically, societies were dominated by men. The social definition of women
was more like a fertility machine. When I watched historical TV series, I was like thank
god I wasn’t born in that era! It’s so pathetic… I think it’s because our generation, the
“80s”, had access to much more things, and the social resources we enjoyed are much
richer than generations before us, we have more space for this self-consideration.

Except Ming (60s) who was mentioned in the previous section, only one “80s” and one
“90s” admitted that the need for carrying on the family line was still considered during her
fertility decision-making process. Cathy was born in 1985, Dongguan, a city adjoining Shenzhen
in Guangdong province. She was then brought to Hong Kong by her parents at the age of 12 or
13 and stayed there ever since. After the outbreak of the pandemic, she came back to mainland
China and settled in Shenzhen. She admits that she is more “traditional” on fertility issues, but
also stressed that this is mainly a result of family influence.
It’s just a traditional thought, like after marriage you should have kids. Also the notion of
“carrying on the family line” is quite deep… I actually don’t have much gender
preference myself, but if the first child is a boy, there would be less pressure. After all, if
your first child is a daughter, elders in the family will definitely urge you to have another,
and say things like “hurry up and have a boy!” Maybe our Cantonese elders still have this
notion ingrained.

Judy, born in 1995, is the first generation to be born and raised in the city of Shenzhen.
She is an only child. Her parents are both from Chaozhou, a coastal city in eastern Guangdong.
After graduating from the most renowned high school in Shenzhen, she went studying in the
States and met her husband in the university. She was pregnant in 2018 and married right after
graduation in the same year. To her, this tradition is an inheritance of certain regional cultures.
To be honest, there are some (of this concern). My parents are both from Chaozhou, so
they are more influenced by the familistic values, including myself… But when I was
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born, One-Child Policy was very strict, and my mom did not recover well from giving
birth to me, so they ended up having only one child… kind of regretful. It’s not like they
don’t like daughters, they will definitely treat us the same if they could have a son. It’s
just… having no son will always draw much more pressure and rumors from the big
family. So my mom always urges me to give birth at an early age for health concerns, and
the chance to have more babies.

Noticeably, three interviewees who claimed to have been influenced by the traditional
fertility thoughts have all stressed their connections with a certain regional culture, a factor that I
did not take in my research design previously. Hua (80s) also mentioned her impression of Judy’s
hometown, Chaozhou.
Umm… in our everlasting Confucious society, people are brainwashed. Sometimes, I
think this brainwash is really effective… We often say that in Chaozhou of Guangdong,
or Fujian province, most women will persuade themselves into obeying these traditions,
like once I get married I will have kids. It’s the mindset bred by traditional male
dominated society. I have two Chaozhou women as neighbors, both young and quit their
jobs immediately after marriage. They told us everyday that they were preparing for
pregnancy… Even high education has little effect on their judgement in this kind of thing.
This kind of regional culture has a really big effect. I think in Chaozhou, both mothers
and wives really accept the idea that sons and husbands are my everything. Maybe it’s
getting better now for younger people. I have a friend who is married to a Chaozhou
husband. She told me that the first time she went to the family for dinner, there’s no
dinnerware for women on the table, only dinnerware for men. And it’s a really well off
family! I think their male-centered culture is really ingrained.

Chaoshan area is the east coastal area of Guangdong province that includes four
cities--Chaozhou, Shantou, Shanwei and Jieyang. In the late Qing period when the whole country
was practicing a closed door policy, Chaozhou was one of the five ports that were forced open by
the foreign invaders, and the whole area soon became one the largest trading centers (Cheng
1997). In the open-up policy in the 1970s, Shantou became one of the few coastal cities that were
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established as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). In such a trading area with considerable
affluence, features of clan society were largely maintained, and familism prevailed in the age of
individualism (Luo et al. 2019). According to the Department of Civil Affairs of Guangdong
Province, the divorce rate of three cities in the Chaoshan area-- Shantou, Chaozhou, and Jieyang
in 2018 are the first to third lowest in Guangdong, while Shanwei ranked the sixth lowest. In
contrast, Shenzhen obtained the highest divorce rate in Guangdong. This area is previously
famous for its obsession with high fertility and incredible male dominance. Even in the strictest
years of OCP, none of my Chaoshanese classmates are single children. A family with two is still
a rare case. They often went for three to five children. Judy recalled that one of her Chaoshan
classmates has eight siblings, all female including herself. “It went famous in our school, we
referred to them as ‘The Nine Sisters’.” She then commented that, “some families just won’t stop
until they have a son, so it’s common to have families with several elder sisters and one young
brother.”
The Chaoshan area is only one example. There are many other places that present unique
values and customs derived from regional cultures. Ming (60s) also mentioned worship of family
line as some more common practice “in my hometown”, and she is from Shandong province, the
hometown of Confucius. Generational clashes on family line obsession are more often presented
between the “60s” “70s” and their parents or in-laws. Therefore, it appears in my interviews that
the consideration of family lines varied more regionally than generationally, among urban
middle-class women from the “60s” to the “90s”.

Motherhood Central to Womanhood v.s. Special Experiences
Are women born or built to have children? How is womanhood defined? What does
childbearing mean to a woman’s life? These questions have raised heated debates over the
century, particularly when the concept of DINK (Double Incomes, No Kid) spreaded in China in
the 1980s. When I asked my interviewees about their opinions on women who choose not to
have children, all interviewees in the 60s and three in the 70s group suggested that women
without children were “incomplete” in life experience, and women deliberately made this choice
are more or less “self-centered” or “irresponsible”. These comments reflect a notion that
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centralizes motherhood in womanhood, and considers an intended childless lifestyle a result of
problematic personality.
Pang was born in Guangzhou, Guangdong, 1964. She came to Shenzhen in 1984 seeking
more opportunities, got married in 1988 and had a son two years later. Having retired, she is now
living with her husband. She commented that having no children is a loss in life and that
childfree women have a rather incomplete life experience. Li, born in 1967, Beijing, got married
in 1993 and gave birth to her son in 1999. She came to Shenzhen in 1995 to work as a
saleswoman, and retired in 2017 at the age of 50. She was on a vacation in Hainan alone by the
time of the interview. Her attitude is also explicit.
Q: So why do you choose to have a child?
A: I think, as a woman, if she doesn’t have a child, her life is incomplete. You must be a
mother. From a daughter, and then getting married, after that you should become a
mother, otherwise your life is incomplete. So I’m… quite traditional.
…
Q: Do you think having children is an indispensable part of a woman’s life?
A: Of course! That’s why I don’t quite understand why nowadays some girls don’t want
to have children. As a woman (without children) her life is incomplete, she hasn’t been a
mother, how can she… I think after a woman becomes a mother she becomes more
tender, that’s why I think you must become a mother. After (having children) her whole
worldview and feelings will be different, more sensitive.

Different from the norm of marriage-children, this expectation of childbearing is not tied
to marriage, but to being women itself. Since the uterus is one of the most essential biological
structural differences between women and men, childbearing is considered to be a unique life
experience that distinguishes womanhood from manhood. A rejection of motherhood is a waste
of such endowed ability that leads to a rather incomplete life as a woman. What’s more
noteworthy is that Li also mentioned that the changes—becoming more “tender” and
“sensitive”—that occurred to women after childbirth are also solid reasons for the necessity of
motherhood. Childbearing is not only the central experience that defines womanhood, but also a
process that strengthens traditional feminine quality, making a woman “more woman”.
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Pang (64s) commented that people who choose to go DINK might be “dodging
responsibility” and more “self-centered”. She showed sympathy for people who could not afford
to have children, but also said that generally the economic barrier in raising children is
manageable. Hong (70s) suggested that people who insist on going DINK might have
experienced certain abnormality.
Because I think you can just let it be, have children when you physically can, lead a
childfree life if you can’t. It’s okay. If it’s really determined, like you just don’t want kids,
that might be… for us we might not understand… Nowadays many men and women are
sterile/infertile… But if there’s no such (objective) problems, and you just decided this
way, I think there must be some kind of problem, maybe the effects from their families of
origin, or the genetic disease… There must be some kind of reason.

On the contrary, two “70s” all the interviewees in “80s” and “90s” expressed their
understanding for women who choose to go DINK. Although they admit that having children is
one of the most special and cherished experiences they have ever had, they still show substantial
respect and empathy for women who make other life choices. Hua (80s) and several other
interviewees of “80s” and “90s” told me about their childfree friends.
People have different family origins and social backgrounds, so I respect their own
choices. As long as they are happy, it’s not much of a problem. I have a Hongkong friend
who’s about 50. She and her husband are pretty well off. She doesn’t want kids. Firstly,
she might not like this… idea of kids. She might think she doesn’t know how to get along
with kids. Then, she’s a very positive, out-going woman, so I can imagine that even when
she gets old she can call a bunch of besties together and have a happy life. Maybe for her
to take care of a much younger person with blood relation, to worry much for him/her is a
bit too much.

Wang, (70s) the only interviewee that considered childbearing a complete compromise to
her husband, later expressed her gratitude for her husband’s demand for a child, because
everyday she “loves her son more”, and experienced the joy of motherhood that she previously
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did not understand. However, when asked about attitudes towards women who choose to go
DINK, she still expressed her great appreciation for people who have the courage to adopt a
childfree lifestyle.
I think they are truly happy! Women who don’t want children, I applaud them. They are
my idols. That’s the status that I really desire. And they… must be full of happiness. And
these women must be less likely to catch disease. And they must have greater longevity.
What kind of people lead a DINK life? I think they must be enjoying their life very much.
And their life must be reaching a certain level of quality in all aspects, because, how
confident they are! They are capable enough to handle all the things in their life, so they
choose this lifestyle… When you have children you will understand! So exhausting.

It is clear that among my interviewees, younger people present more acceptance and
understanding for childless lifestyles than older people, indicating that society is becoming
increasingly inclusive towards women’s fertility decisions. The emergence of increasing family
structures in our age is deconstructing the norm that defines womanhood with motherhood, and
creating more alternative life paths for women.

Emotional Support and Old-Age Care
Xie and Yu suggest in their qualitative research (2019) that, in contemporary China, the
familistic complex is still prevalent and that cases of childfree marriage or extramarital birth are
still relatively rare. Apart from influences of traditional cultures that prevailed in East Asia, the
market reform has given rise to individualism while simultaneously elevating people’s
interdependence in families. According to Song and Ji (2020), “the care duty” that was “shifted
back from the socialist state to families” in the marketization process has led to clashes between
ideologies of individual fulfillment and familistic values. Family or kinship is still the major and
irreplaceable source of emotional support and care. The purpose of having children as a life-long
companion and social safety net still serves as a main reason in women’s fertility decisions to
this date. Most of my interviewees from all age cohorts expressed their desire for children’s
company, especially when they age. Liu (70s) suggested that, “it’s mainly for the consideration
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of old-age… because I think when you are aged and don’t have children by your side, or if you
are sick there’s no one there to pay you a visit, you might get really lonely.” Yuan (70s)
expressed a similar concern: “there will be one day that you and your couple finally get too old
and sick to look after each other. What could you do without your children’s help?” Hong (60s),
Liang (80s), Cheng (90s), and Zhu (90s) claimed the company of children “irreplaceable.” They
all expressed the notion that kinship is the only stable relationship throughout their lifetime.
Within this ideology of familism, people possess high expectations and dependence on family
and believe that this norm will restraint family members from being estranged. In general,
familism still prevails as one of the major reasons in having children, and this ideology does not
show evident generational differences in my interviews.
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CHAPTER TWO
How Many Children: Strategic Plan on Fertility
“I would consider at least two, so that they can accompany each other… Three is too
much. I won’t have enough time and energy for them… We did not consider the
economic condition as a major factor… Raising children was not that costly back then.
It’s mainly on education. One or two, doesn’t make much difference. My daughter went
to public schools all along, so the tuition is very cheap. Sending her abroad was the only
thing that cost some money… ”
—— Zeng, born in 1968.
“I think two children are enough. Three… I think I can’t afford three. And also not
enough time and energy… Economic condition is quite important I think. Personally, if
you don’t have a solid economic base for your second child, it’s unnecessary to have one.
Firstly, it only adds to your burden. Secondly, I think maybe you can’t support his/her
education well enough. So I think a second child should definitely be based on adequate
conditions. ”
—— Zhu, born in 1994.

Historically, China has maintained a high fertility rate. “More children, more blessings”
served as a major fertility mindset that prevailed for centuries under the domination of
Confucianism. The value of family solidarity and prosperity in East Asia has penetrating affects
through the modernization process. Starting from the Maoist China, fertility behaviors were
given meanings to the nationalist discourse. One of the most famous quotes of Mao Zedong
indicated, “Ren duo liliang da (The more people, the stronger we are),” which suggested a
development ideology that associated high fertility with the prosperity of the nation. During the
post-mao era, two major reforms transformed the whole society together with people’s fertility
behavior drastically. One-Child Policy directly forced people’s fertility plan, especially that of
the urban residents, into a one-child style. Fertility decision was once again taken into a broad
political picture, only this time with the intention to reduce it. Economic reform which initiated
the marketization process nationally has drastically elevated the GDP level and contributed
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hugely to the advancement of living standards (Ellman 1986). Meanwhile, the prices of
commodities and real estates soared, while the cost of child rearing has boosted and is expected
to continue going up. Apart from political agendas, having less children is also an economically
rational choice for most parents. In addition, the professionalization of housekeeping and
baby-sitting services in the past few years provided urban middle-class families with more
convenience and flexibility.
All of my interviewees intend to have one to two children, with a majority across all age
cohorts preferring two children, but they also show generationally varied concerns on their
family planning. Their strategic plan on fertility, to be specific, is mainly the decision of the
number of children they would like to have. While both strongly influenced by policy changes,
the older generation suggested more limitation on time and energy and less economic worries,
while the younger generations expressed more economic but no less time and energy concerns.

Economic Influence
The direct costs of children seems to increase due to changes in young adults' earning
power and living standards. Song and Ji (2020) argued that the family’s “economic functions”
had been “redefined under the socialist economy in the 1950s-1970s”, and have been
“rediscovered under the market-oriented reforms since the 1980s.” The widening of wealth gap
and narrowing upward mobility have caused the intensification of pressure of competition and
anxiety. Thus, parents put more and more emphasis on their children’s education in hope of
realizing upward mobility or resisting downward movement. The cost of child rearing rose at an
unprecedented level.
All the “60s”, three out of five “70s” and one out of five “80s” claimed that their fertility
decisions were not much affected by their economic status, because back then child rearing was
not a large expense. Hong (70s) did not feel much economic pressure raising her daughter J,
because she sent J to public elementary and secondary schools, which is nearly free if you are
locals. Chen (80s) did a full calculation of expenditure on children from diapers to cram schools
to show me that children do not cause much economic burden.
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However, two out of three interviewees in “90s” and three out of five “80s” suggested
that economic condition is very important. Liang, born in 1989, complained that the tuition fee
for kindergarten was two times higher than six years ago. Zhu (90s) claimed that economic
condition is the major forces that shape her fertility decisions.
I think two children are enough. Three… I think I can’t afford three. And also not enough
time and energy… Economic condition is quite important I think. Personally, if you don’t
have a solid economic base for your second child, it’s unnecessary to have one. Firstly, it
only adds to your burden. Secondly, I think maybe you can’t support his/her education
well enough. So I think a second child should definitely be based on adequate conditions.

If the economic prospects appear unpromising and the social welfare system is still
underdeveloped, do younger generations express more interests in financial support from
children? The answer is no. None of my interviewees demanded for old-age financial support
from their children. They all stated that by the time of retirement they will have enough savings
and pension for their own old-age security, and some of them are even willing to help their
children “out of trouble” or “achieve something”. They stressed that their generosity for children
was not intended for returns, and would be content enough if their children are able to lead a
happy, safe and unregretful life. Some of the “60s” and “70s” said that they would be satisfied
enough if their children ever reached complete financial independence.

Time and Energy
Material resources are only one aspect of responsible parenting. Healthy family
relationships and children’s psychological well-being depend heavily on quality time that parents
spend with their children (Crouter et al. 2004; Desha et al. 2011). Although it is widely believed
that contemporary children are less emotionally affected by their parents than their earlier
counterparts due to more time spent with peers and in social media, scholars argue that parents
remain a significant influence to their children’s mental health status and personality
development (Reinfjell et al. 2008; Desha et al. 2011). In fact, more and more parents are starting
to be concerned about their participation in each of their children’s lives. As a result, parents tend
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to have less children to share their limited “time and energy”, and pay close attention to each of
them.
While all of my interviewees stressed the importance of time and energy in their fertility
decision, none of them considered three or more as their ideal number of children--except one
“90s”, who was preparing for the second pregnancy, and leaving the possibility of three. Yong
(60s) thinks one child is enough, due to her limited time and energy.
Q: How many children do you originally plan to have, regardless of any external factors?
A: At first I just think one is enough. And there is also the policy, so I chose to have one.
Q: So it’s like, even if there’s no such policy, you still think one is enough, right?
A: Yes. Because… I think I myself can only handle one… it’s like, for example, after the
childbirth you need to educate them, you need to spend your time and energy on them. So
I think for my time and energy, one is enough.

Ying (70s) holds a similar concern. “Childbearing is relatively easy, but childrearing is
really exhausting. It’s all about time and energy.” For the “90s”, limited time and energy
continues to be a major reason for ideal children numbers.

Political
For the parents born in the 60s and 70s who generally have their children under the
One-Child Policy from 1980 to 2015, fertility choice on the number of children is substantially
narrowed. OCP was officially enacted in 1980, relaxed in 2013 to a partial Two-Child Policy,
where couples are allowed to have two children if either one of them is an only child, and
replaced by Universal Two-Child Policy in 2015. During its enforcement, urban scrutiny and
punishment for violating OCP are more manageable, thus more threatening than those of the
rural areas. Couples with non-agricultural household registration status (hukou), who make up
the most part of urban residents, would face heavy fines calculated with level of personal
incomes and the city’s average incomes, as well as high risk of losing employment (especially in
state-owned company) and the right to register their children to healthcare and education if they
have more than one child (Gu et al. 2007). In 2005, the one child rate of women born between
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1961 and 1970 who mostly reached the end of their fertility years exceeded 40 percent, which
varied from less than 20 percent in some western provinces such as Guizhou and Yunnan, to
about 80 percent in urban centers like Beijing and Shanghai. This share was above 90 percent for
couples with non-agricultural hukou in ten Chinese provincial regions (Feng et al. 2013).
None of my “60s” and “70s” interviewees are single children in their families, and all of
them, except one “70s”, have only one child. Yuan, born in 1975, came to Shenzhen in 1998, and
married in 2000. She had a daughter in 2001, and after “weighing the pros and cons
meticulously”, decided to go to Hongkong and had a son in 2005. Yuan and her husband were
both employed in wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOE), and were thus exempt from the
risk of losing their jobs. Going Hongkong or abroad was a widely utilized legislative loophole to
evade OCP for those who can afford it. Yuan described their hesitation before this decision, and
gratitude after it.
In fact, at first we did not plan to evade the policy although we really like children…
After all, the price is still relatively high. Fine is just a small part, it’s mainly children’s
education that we worried about. And most of my mainland peers have only one child, so
we didn’t think much… But you see, my husband and I were both working in
foreign-owned companies, so we had a lot of Hong Kong colleagues who have two
children. I was really envious, and thought that it’s still better for children to have some
company of their age. Our daughter was also desiring a little brother or sister. We then
had this idea… The process is truly troublesome, but it was still much more convenient
for us than people who lived in inland areas, because Hong Kong is just by our side! …
Finally I told my husband that the trouble is only for a short while, but if we succeed, the
child can accompany us for a lifetime… And the future is unknown. If the regulation
becomes stricter, it will be too late to regret… You see now, the fertility policy has been
loosened, but many friends of ours cannot have babies anymore. I have friends who are
very envious of us, always saying things like, look at your family! A boy and a girl, how
blessed! We are always glad to have that courage and determination at that time.

Except for Yong (60s) and Li (70s) who think one child is enough considering the limited
time and energy one could spare, and Wang (70s) who did not plan to have children, other
women who were restricted by the OCP all expressed their wish to have two.
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Actually, before the One-Child Policy, we were planning to have two, because one child
might be lonely. But the OCP happened to enact, so one it is.

However, some also claimed their lack of consideration because of the choiceless
situation. Hong (60s) said:

Emm, at my time, when I was pregnant with her, I still worked in a state-owned company.
Basically the national policy only allowed us to have one child, so I haven’t even thought
of the question of having how many children. Just thought to have one.
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Conclusion and Discussion

In accordance with the previous qualitative research on China, the result shows that
contemporary urban middle-class women’s values on marriage and fertility, individual
fulfillment and families did present noticeable generational differences.
In Chapter one, I explored how these women make senses of giving birth to their children
and the rationales behind such decisions. Their generational disparities are highlighted during
this process. People in the 60s are heavily influenced by gender norms. These norms are
generated through traditional patriarchal values that attach marriages to childrearing. People in
the 80s and 90s are instead heavily influenced by their only child status. They show great
affections toward their children. Such disparity might also be resulted from the disparity of their
children’s ages. But people in the 80s and 90s also have greater autonomy that comes with
different rationales of having children.
In Chapter two, I discuss the role of one-child policy and two-child policy in people’s
decision-making. Economic reform and open-up policy, which brought private marketization to
Chinese economy also have their impacts on people’s decision-making. Younger generations are
facing greater cost-of-living, which makes them frugal parents. But all age groups show
significant consideration of the financial and mental cost of child-rearing.
All in all, only part of the phenomenon described in SDT theory is shown in my project.
The result shows that urban middle-class women’s values on fertility and the structural factors
that shape their fertility decision both. However, these shifts did not necessarily affect their ideal
number of children. Under multiple influences of social norms, economic development and
political agenda, China appears to be experiencing the First and the Second Demographic
Transition partially and simultaneously.
While both strongly influenced by policy changes, the older generation suggested more
limitation on time and energy and less economic worries, while the younger generations
expressed more economic but no less time and energy concerns.
In conclusion, China is still in the process of First Demographic Transition and at the
start of Second Demographic Transition.
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